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of the intellect break down. They either beg the question at once, 
in that intellect is defined in such a way as to mean something which 
cannot give truth, or they involve an appeal to the intellect the in-
competence of which they are designed to demonstrate. On the 
other hand, Bergson's intuition, which is to give relief from the 
deadlocks which the intellect creates, will do nothing of the sort. 
Not only does it raise more difficulties than it solves, but it can 
only be expressed by reference to the intellect and the objects of 
the intellect. 
The reason for this collapse of the Bergsonian philosophy is 
obvious. Bergson has only repeated the mistakes for which he re-
proaches Kant. In order to sav$ the freedom of the will, God and 
immortality from all possible assaults of the intellect, Kant put 
these realities outside all possible knowledge. In much the same 
way, in order to have an answer to all possible difficulties which 
the intellect creates (and because he is apparently ignorant of the 
intellectual solution of certain classic difficulties), and in order to 
be able to say that what gives truth is not intellect, Bergson has to 
make intellect and intuition radically opposed to one another. But 
having so separated intellect and intuition, Bergson cannot justify 
either of them. He has not dealt fairly with intellect and has re-
stricted it beforehand to that which is assumed not to be real. At 
the same time every attempt which Bergson makes to apply his 
doctrine of intuition, to show why intuition is necessary to supple-
ment intellect, contradicts his own account of the nature of intuition. 
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ANYNESS AND PURE FORM. 
On another page in this issue, Prof. E. H. Strange criticizes 
Bergson's theory of intuition and derives it from Bergson's oppo-
sition to Kant's idealism. 
In this connection it is appropriate to state that Kant bases 
his philosophy on the consideration that the highest laws of nature 
are identical with the mathematical or purely formal theorems. 
The latter are verified and indeed created by pure reflection, which 
means they are mind-made; or, as Kant expresses himself, they 
are products of a priori thought, they are transcendental, they 
serve us as the forms with whose help we reduce sense-impress-
ions to well regulated experiences. 
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Kant asks in his Prolegomena,1 "How is the agreement be-
tween the highest laws of nature and the theorems of purely formal 
thought possible?" and he sees only two possibilities. Either, says 
Kant, we find these laws in nature by experience or the mind makes 
these laws, and his answer is that the human intellect is so con-
stituted that it can see the world only as its own tools shape it. 
Kant declares that the world of material things surrounding us 
can be recognized by the mind only according to the mind's con-
stitution, not as the things are in themselves. The mind imposes 
its own laws upon the objective world. The opposite view, that 
the mind has derived its laws from the objective world, is ex-
cluded because we know positively that mathematics are mind-
made, they are a priori. We can construct all mathematics with-
out appealing to any experience of the senses. 
Crusius, a German contemporary of Kant, proposed the theory 
that some world intellect, the creator or God, has established a 
preconceived harmony between mind and the universe, equipping 
the mind of man with such a mentality as to enable him to build 
up the highest (the purely formal) laws of the world constitution 
out of his own mental resources—a proposition which is quite 
plausible before a tribunal of theologians, but scarcely acceptable 
to philosophers. 
Now comes Bergson, and having gone through a study of 
Kant (according to Professor Strange) he finds himself nonplused 
by Kantian idealism, and he sees another, a fourth, way out of 
the dilemma. On the basis of a misconceived interpretation of 
evolution he proposes that "intellect and matter have progressively 
adapted themselves to one another to attain at last a common 
form" (Creative Evolution, p. 217). This fourth possibility as 
proposed by Bergson is probably the most unfortunate theory of 
all, for it presupposes the notion that neither the highest laws of 
nature nor the truths of mathematical propositions have been 
stable. 
Bergson seems to assume that the highest laws of nature as 
well as mathematical theorems were loose rules in the beginning 
and have gradually hardened into definite norms. The intellect 
and the material world have been in contact and have influenced 
each other. Our observation of the stars has gradually impressed 
itself upon their movements so as to assume more and more a 
definite mathematical form. Finally Kepler succeeded in sum-
* This and the following quotations are from memory. 
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marizing their motions in definite mathematical formulas. Before 
the mind was in touch with them they may have had other uni-
formities, or lack of uniformity, of motion. On the other hand 
the mind was rambling at first and mathematical theorems varied; 
but gradually they assumed definite form, and now a thinking 
being can evolve them out of the resources of his own mind by 
a priori argument. 
This kind of interpretation of the agreement between mind 
and nature by a mutual adaptation of the intellect on the one side 
and the objective world on the other, displays a lack of insight 
into the very nature of mathematics, and misconceives also the 
character of natural law. 
Take for instance the simple a priori statement that 2x2 = 4. 
Can there ever have been a time in which this statement was not 
true? There was a time indeed when the mind could not think 
in figures at all, when an arithmetical equation or an algebraic 
formula or a geometrical theorem must have been unmeaning to 
a sentient being. Indeed formal thoughts are still void of meaning 
to animals and are above the comprehension of savages; never-
theless their truth is established, and the celestial bodies moved 
according to the laws of Kepler before mankind originated and 
mathematical theorems were ever constructed. Kepler discovered 
his three laws; he did not invent them. To think that the objective 
truth of the highest laws of nature originated through a process 
of evolution indicates a misunderstanding not only of the very 
nature of mathematics, but also of the theory of evolution, and 
finally also of science itself. 
We believe that Kant raised the problem of problems in philos-
ophy, and explained his reasoning in his Prolegomena, which there-
fore, in our opinion, is the most important book that came from 
his pen. Kant's significance and the prominent place he holds in 
philosophy are due to the fact that he put his finger on the critical 
question, though he did not succeed in answering it. He established 
beyond the shadow of a doubt the apriority of all the formal sci-
ences, but he explained this truth wrongly and has thus given rise 
to a wrong idealism, deriving therefrom an agnosticism which he 
formulated in the doctrine that things in themselves are unknowable. 
His disciples have come to the conclusion that things in themselves 
do not exist, and we suggest that what he really meant were "forms 
in themselves" viz., the Platonic ideas or types of things and they 
are not unknowable. 
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In consideration of the significance of the Kantian problem, 
which was suggested to him by Hume's skepticism as to the univer-
sal validity of the law of causation, we have published a translation 
of Kant's Prolegomena with our own criticism, substituting for 
Kant's solution our own which is the basis of the philosophy of 
science. 
We grant that all formal knowledge, including logic and math-
ematics, is a priori, but the conditions for a construction of math-
ematics after all presuppose experience and the basis of mathematics 
is the creation of an abstract realm of pure form. For a construc-
tion of the purely formal sciences we exclude everything particular 
and concrete, matter as well as energy, and retain only our own 
activity with a scope of pure motion which involves the possibility 
of constructing pure interrelations. In other words, the tools with 
which we operate are ultimately derived from experience. We 
retain our ability to operate, our activity, our mode of moving about, 
but we move in a field void of particularity, a field which therefore 
can be applied anywhere. 
We insist that mathematics and all the other purely formal 
sciences are not constructed from nothingness; they are ultimately 
based on experience. But from this experience is excluded every-
thing that pertains to sense-experience, and we produce in this 
way a domain in which we construct relations that do not contain 
particulars, but outline conditions which apply anywhere to any 
place and to any time, and we have called this field of pure thought 
"anyness." The very term anyness contains an explanation of 
why these propositions can be applied anywhere, and this application 
anywhere involves that a priori propositions are both (as Kant 
rightly declares) universal and necessary. 
By understanding the full significance of anyness, we under-
stand also that these laws of pure form must apply to any possible 
world, real or imaginary. Thus we can in pure thought deduce the 
inevitable results of conditions under any circumstances, and we 
can understand that if there is a world of concrete materiality, its 
motions, constructions, formations and results of any kind of ac-
tions are—so far as their forms, their relations, are concerned— 
predetermined by the laws of pure form, viz., by the laws of anyness. 
Thus harmony must obtain between the purely formal laws as 
we have produced them by a priori construction and as they appear 
in the concrete world of reality, because the two are the same. Sup-
pose two mathematicians construct a parabola with the same co-
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ordinates, would they not both come to the same conclusions as to 
the form of the parabola? And suppose that in reality a comet 
is determined by forces which possess a one-to-one correspondence 
with these same coordinates, would not the path of the comet possess 
a one-to-one correspondence to the figures of the parabolas of the 
two astronomers? The determinedness of all purely formal con-
structions is truly universal and applies anywhere in the domain 
of mathematics or pure thought and in any possible real world, also 
in this our world, i. e., the universe in which we live. 
Considering the immanent necessity of the laws of form we can 
understand that this pre-established harmony has not been made by 
some supernatural being nor can it have originated gradually by a 
process of evolution, but it is intrinsically necessary. It is the 
immanent order which is the condition both of our natural laws 
and the intelligibility of existence. It is that same intrinsic regu-
larity which can be observed everywhere in nature. This same 
regularity in the domain of form makes it possible that rational 
beings originate, that science can be established, that ideals can be 
proposed and lived up to, that a code of morality and a norm of 
right conduct can be formulated, and that the universe presents 
itself as a well-regulated and law-ordained cosmos. 
A revision of almost all problems of philosophy from our 
standpoint will shed new light on their solutions, as will appear when 
we consider Prof. Hartley B. Alexander's article on "The Defini-
tion of Number." When enumerating the different conceptions 
of the interrelation between logical and mathematical views on the 
one side and philosophy on the other, he omits to mention the solu-
tion offered by the philosophy of form, which alone can be re-
garded as the philosophy of science. 
Mr. Bertrand Russell sees the most essential feature of math-
ematics in its logical interrelations and goes so far as to claim that 
mathematics has nothing to do with space. Without objecting to 
definitions we prefer to regard at least geometry as the purely 
formal science of extension, which means space, not real space but 
pure or mathematical space. Mathematics presupposes logic and 
contains one additional element which is commonly called space, 
but like all purely formal sciences mathematics produces its objects 
of investigation by a priori construction. The elements with which 
we start are products of abstract thought in the realm of pure form, 
created by thinking away everything that is particular, viz., all con-
crete objects that consist of matter and energy. Thus we retain 
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the idea of pure motion and a possibility of establishing pure inter-
relations. 
Pure motion means a change of place without implying energy, 
and a possibility of pure interrelations is a field of pure motion. 
We start with these two abstract notions, on the part of the subject 
an ability to move about, on the part of the object, (i. e., the sur-
rounding world), emptiness; and this emptiness offers a field of 
possible motion. With these conditions we construct whatever we 
may be pleased to build up, and observe the result. 
In geometry we do something and note what will come of it. 
For instance, we move and note the trace of our motion. We call it 
a line. We move again and again, and let the traces of other lines 
enclose a space; we call the result a figure. Where two lines cross 
we have a point. 
The system under construction may be Euclidean or non-
Euclidean according to our start, whether or not we assume we are 
able to draw straight lines in the Euclidean space.' If in our plan 
of construction we exclude the straight line, we will have to move 
according to a definite principle in curves of a predetermined con-
stant deviation, in which case our system will be different from the 
system of Euclid. 
If two straight lines cross, the product of our construction is 
an angle, or rather four angles. The peculiarity of mathematics is 
to watch and observe the inevitable results of our own constructions, 
but the main characteristic of our constructions is this, that they are 
made in a field of anyness, i. e., they apply to any kind of con-
struction made in the same way, not only in emptiness, but in any 
kind of a world filled with any kind of matter or any kind of energy. 
The nature of matter and energy can only be discovered by 
experience through the senses, but the nature of pure interrelations 
can be determined by building up constructions in a field of anyness, 
as they must be under any conditions, which means under all con-
ditions. Therefore the laws of pure form (in other words, the laws 
of anyness) will be valid for any kind of a world. 
Thus we have an explanation why the theorems of pure mathe-
matics are hyperphysical truths, and here we have a specimen of 
the nature of what theology has called the supernatural. There is 
only this difference between the old conception of the supernatural 
and this new conception of it which for the sake of distinction 
'For an a priori construction of the plane, the straight line and the right 
angle see the author's Foundations of Mathematics. 
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we call the "hyperphysical," that the latter is as clear and self-
evident as the former is mysterious, hazy, bewildering and mysti-
fying. 
The consequence of this conception of mathematics need not be 
traced here in all details, but we feel assured that in the long run 
it will solve all the modern problems of philosophy and dispose of 
the troubles which have been caused by pragmatism, Bergsonianism, 
by the advocates of the principle of relativity, and also by the 
logisticians. EDITOR. 
LOUIS COUTURAT (1868-1914). 
Besides the carnage in battleships and trenches, the great Euro-
pean war carries with it many accidental by-products of disaster not 
to be overlooked when casting up the grand total of losses the world 
is suffering. In the early days of last August when the first com-
motion in the commercial arteries to and from Paris was at its 
height, a heavy automobile at full speed chanced to run down the 
carriage in which Louis Couturat was traveling, and his immediate 
death was the result. Though only forty-six years old he held first 
rank in France among scientific workers in the philosophy of lan-
guage, the philosophy of mathematics, and especially in the more 
modern aspect of logic—for which he agrees with English logicians 
in preferring the term "logistic," now that this word is but little 
known in its earlier significations listed in the dictionaries. 
M. Couturat was singularly well informed on many questions, 
but the particular power and quality of his mind lay in a gift for 
deductive reasoning combined with the most punctilious intellectual 
honesty that would never countenance a compromise with the truths 
of reason. All his work is especially remarkable for the clearness 
of its representation. His style is never sullied by glittering and 
bizarre phrases intended to attract attention and admiration, but 
which often seem to cover a multitude of sins in the way of vague 
ideas and loose reasoning. 
Couturat was first known by his painstaking and illuminating 
exposition of the mathematical infinite (L'infini mathimatique, 
1896) in which he discusses the idea of number and analyzes the 
concepts of continuity and the infinite, refuting practically all of 
Renouvier's arguments against the latter. His research in this 
line familiarized him with all the writings of Leibniz, and his next 
published work was an edition of more than two hundred fragments 
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